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Articles 
RICHARDSON V. RAMIREZ:  A MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER 
Richard W. Bourne* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Richardson v. Ramirez,1 the Supreme Court held that felon 
disfranchisement statutes are constitutionally authorized by Section 2 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  By its terms, Section 2 limits a state’s share 
of seats in Congress and its electoral votes to the extent that the state 
abridges voting rights and excepts from such limitation denials of the 
right to vote to persons on account of “rebellion, or other crime.”  The 
Supreme Court explained that the background and legislative history of 
Section 2 failed to shed light on the meaning of the exception clause, and, 
thus, left the Court free to give a literal application of its terms for 
determining whether Section 2 sanctioned state felon disfranchisement 
laws.2 
This Article argues that members of the Richardson Court totally 
misread Section 2.  The Court failed to uncover the legislative history of 
the Section,3 to consider the provision in light of the other provisions of 
the Amendment as they were first contemplated,4 or to read it in light of 
the purpose it was designed to achieve.5  When read in light of the goals 
its language was designed to advance, Section 2 should not be construed 
as an explicit endorsement of felon disfranchisement statutes, much less 
as an authorization for the states to adopt them.  Instead, Section 2 
should be read as part of a larger scheme aimed at undergirding the 
Republican Party and the rights of the newly freed African American 
slaves, who were rightly perceived to be its likely adherents, by 
encouraging their inclusion in the electorate of a New American South 
                                                 
*  Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law.  LL.B., University of 
Virginia, 1968; LL.M., Harvard Law School, 1975.  I wish to thank my research assistant, 
Eric Massof, for hours of work ploughing through the Congressional Globe and other 
primary resource materials in developing the legislative history of Section 2 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Eric gave me a lot of ideas as I developed this piece; the errors, of 
course, are my own. 
1 418 U.S. 24 (1974). 
2 See infra notes 17-24 (discussing the Court’s opinion of the case). 
3 See infra Part III (exploring the history of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
4 See infra Part III (exploring the history of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
5 See infra Part III (exploring the history of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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while simultaneously excluding, from the same area’s electorate 
unreconstructed whites who had participated in the lost cause of 
Confederate rebellion.  
II.  FELON DISFRANCHISEMENT STATUTES, THE RIGHT OF RACIAL AND 
ETHNIC MINORITIES TO VOTE, AND RICHARDSON V. RAMIREZ 
In recent years, it has become obvious that the various felon 
disfranchisement6 statutes of many states disfranchise large and 
disproportionate percentages of minority citizens.  The statutory 
schemes under which felons are denied the right to vote are 
extraordinarily variable.7  The number of persons who are so 
disfranchised necessarily varies from state to state and is impossible to 
                                                 
6 In the nineteenth century, and certainly throughout the debates about passage of the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, writers used the word disfranchisement rather than 
the more modern form of the same word, disenfranchisement.  I have chosen to use the older 
form throughout this piece.  One reason for this choice is simple: it is the way the word was 
used by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, whose intent we are trying to discern 
in this article.  In addition, use of the more modern phrase is somewhat ahistorical in that it 
presumes that the persons whose voting rights were primarily at stake in the 
Reconstruction debates, the former slaves of the American South, had previously enjoyed 
access to the ballot, when in fact that was clearly not the case. 
7 See Susan E. Marquardt, Comment, Deprivation of a Felon’s Right to Vote: Constitutional 
Concerns, Policy Issues and Suggested Reform for Felony Disenfranchisement Law, 82 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 279, 284 (2004-2005).  Marquardt notes that only two states, Maine and 
Vermont, afford all adult citizens the right to vote regardless of their criminal history.  Id.  
The rest of the states, plus the District of Columbia, all deny voting eligibility to persons 
convicted of felonies and serving their terms in jails or penitentiaries, and thirty-seven 
states extend the period of disenfranchisement beyond the completion of a felon’s sentence 
while he or she is on probation or serving out parole.  Id.  Fourteen of these thirty-seven 
have laws providing for disfranchisement of felons beyond the completion of their 
sentences, probation or parole.  Id.  See also, Tanya Dugree-Pearson, Note, Current Public 
Law and Policy Issues: Disenfranchisement - A Race Neutral Punishment for Felony Offenders or a 
Way to Diminish the Minority Vote?, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 359, 373-74 (2002).  As 
Dugree-Pearson points out, most of the states that permit disfranchisement long after 
incarceration has ended do so on a permanent basis, though a few only bar ex-offenders 
permanently after they have committed two felonies.  Id.  Two states bar voting for ex-
offenders only for felonies committed in the 1980’s or before, and one state, Texas, restores 
the right to vote two years after an offender has served a full sentence, probation, and 
parole.  Id.  While most states provide some mechanism for restoration of voting rights, 
there is great disparity and confusion regarding when a felon can become eligible for 
reinstatement and what process or processes can be used to achieve this end.  See 
Marquardt, supra, at 284.  In some states, a pardon from the governor is required, while 
others mandate action by the parole or pardons board.  Id.  In a few states there is no 
method for reinstatement, short of a Presidential pardon that can only benefit those 
convicted of federal felonies.  Id.  Overall, the procedures for recovering voting rights once 
lost are daunting.  See also JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT, 84-90 (2006) 
(providing a detailed description of the processes for regaining voting rights and the 
difficulties felons often have in utilizing them). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2007], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss1/1
2007] Richardson v. Ramirez 3 
pinpoint precisely, except in the few states that disfranchise only those 
who are presently incarcerated.8  Nevertheless, reasonably good 
estimates demonstrate that felon disfranchisement statutes, particularly 
in states that permanently disenfranchise felons, deprive a sizable 
proportion of the voting age population of the franchise,9 with the 
impact falling most heavily on minority communities.10  Indeed, the 
evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that felon disfranchisement 
statutes significantly water down the power of minority voting blocs11 
that otherwise might influence elections in ways favorable to their 
members.12 
After the Civil War, Congress passed several Constitutional 
Amendments in order to assure that African-American freedmen, whose 
slavery had been at the center of the war, would not be denied basic 
rights after peace had been secured.  The centerpiece of this 
constitutional legislation was the Fourteenth Amendment.13   Limitations 
                                                 
8 See MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 7, at 72-76 (providing a description of the statistical 
difficulties involved in trying to ascertain precisely how many people in a given state may 
be disfranchised, at least in those states which deny the right to vote after incarceration has 
ended, since no actual counts are available, and attempts to make estimates from the actual 
prison populations of how many felons live in a state after incarceration are quite 
problematic). 
9 See id. at 248-250.  According to Manza and Uggen, the states with the highest 
percentage of voting age populations disfranchised by these statutes are Florida (9.01%), 
Delaware (7.54%), Alabama (7.37%), Mississippi (6.89%), and Virginia (6.76%).  Id. 
10 Id. at 251-53.  According to Manza and Uggen, 8.25 percent of the voting age 
population of African Americans nationally is disenfranchised by these statutes.  Id.  The 
numbers are particularly high in several states with sizeable black populations, such as 
Alabama (15.30%), Florida (18.82%), and Virginia (19.76%).  Id.  Several states with much 
smaller black minorities have even higher percentage of the black voting age population 
disfranchised, including Iowa (33.98%), Kentucky (23.70%), Nebraska (22.70%), Arizona 
(21.08%), and Wyoming (20.03%).  Id. 
11 The evidence is overwhelming.  A much higher percentage of our African American 
population is affected by these statutes than is true of our majority white populations.  This 
can be demonstrated easily by extrapolating from comparisons by race of the numbers of 
persons who are incarcerated or on parole in this country.  See generally MANZA & UGGEN, 
supra note 7, for a relatively up to date analysis of this data. 
12 See id. at 191-98.  The authors demonstrate that, without the felon disfranchisement 
statutes, demographic data as to how African American voters actually vote indicates that 
the Florida presidential tally in 2000, as well as many federal elections for the United States 
Senate and statewide elections for governor would have had quite different results.  Id. 
13 The three Reconstruction Amendments were meant to afford protection to the victims 
and heirs of America’s “peculiar institution.”  The Thirteenth Amendment, promulgated in 
early 1865 and ratified by the states by December 15 of that year, abolished slavery.  See 
RALPH KORNGOLD, THADDEUS STEVENS: A BEING DARKLY WISE AND RUDELY GREAT, 229-33 
(1955) [hereinafter Korngold].  The Fifteenth Amendment, proposed by the Congress in 
early 1869 and ratified nearly thirteen months later, prohibited denial of the right to vote on 
account of race or color.  See EDWARD MCPHERSON, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
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on the franchise, like other denials of fundamental rights, have generally 
been held unconstitutional under this Amendment because they do not 
serve a compelling governmental interest.14  However, the Supreme 
Court has upheld felon disfranchisement laws under a little known, 
never enforced provision of the Fourteenth Amendment:  Section 2, 
which provides:   
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several 
States according to their respective numbers. . . .  But 
when the right to vote at any election for [federal officers 
or state executive or judicial officers or members of the 
state legislature] is denied to any of the male inhabitants 
of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens 
of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for 
participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of 
representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to 
whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age 
in such State.15 
It is anomalous that this Amendment, adopted in the mid-nineteenth 
century in order to enhance the voting power of black Americans, has 
been construed in the last quarter of the twentieth century to authorize 
felon-disfranchisement legislation which strikes at the heart of that 
power.   
Such a construction occurred in 1974 in Richardson v. Ramirez,16 in 
which the Supreme Court held that when the framers of Section 2 
exempted from apportionment persons denied voting rights because of 
“other crimes,” their action constituted an affirmative authorization to 
the states to deny voting rights to people who had been convicted of 
                                                                                                             
STATES OF AMERICA DURING THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION, APRIL 15, 1865 - JULY 15, 1870 
399, 545-56 (1871); CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3rd Sess. 1641 (1869).  Sandwiched in between 
was the jewel of the Reconstruction, the Fourteenth Amendment, the source of due process 
and equal protection limitations on the exercise of state power.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment was passed by the Congress in June 1866 and, after much wrangling, was 
ratified by the necessary three quarters of the state legislatures (including seven newly 
reconstructed former members of the Confederacy) on June 20, 1868.  MCPHERSON, supra, at 
102, 308. 
14 See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); 
Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 
U.S. 701 (1969). 
15 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
16 418 U.S. 24 (1975). 
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felonies.  This conclusion obviated the need to apply the compelling 
governmental interest test, also known as strict scrutiny, which is 
otherwise used to determine whether state voting limitations violate the 
substantive provisions of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.17   
Justice Marshall dissented vigorously from the Richardson decision.  
Accepting the point that felon disfranchisement was commonplace in 
nineteenth century America,18 he nevertheless found the majority’s shift 
from reading Section 2 as refusing to discount disfranchised felons for 
apportionment purposes, to finding in it an affirmative grant to the 
states to deny voting rights to be a gigantic leap, unauthorized by the 
purpose or language of the provision.19  The purpose of Section 2, he 
argued, was clearly to encourage states to enfranchise former slaves, 
suggesting that otherwise the states might lose power in Congress and 
the Electoral College.20  In Marshall’s view, the framers of the provision 
may have recognized that felon disfranchisement existed and even 
                                                 
17 Id. at 54 (distinguishing such cases as Dunn, 405 U.S. 330; Bullock, 405 U.S. 134; Kramer, 
395 U.S. 621; and, Cipriano, 395 U.S. 701).  The opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
“rest[ed] on the . . . proposition that § 1, in dealing with voting rights . . . could not have 
been meant to bar outright a form of disenfranchisement which was expressly exempted 
from the less drastic sanction of reduced representation which § 2 imposed for other forms 
of disenfranchisement.”  Id. at 55.  See also 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).  Because of Richardson v. 
Ramirez, the most recent attacks on the legality of the felon disfranchisement statutes have 
been based on the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”), which as amended in 1982 prohibits 
any voting qualification or standard that has the effect of denial of the right to vote on 
account of race.  Id.; see also Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985); City of Mobile v. 
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).  Richardson did not preclude suits challenging felon 
disfranchisement statutes where plaintiffs were prepared to show that the purpose of the 
disfranchisement statute itself was to deny the right to vote on account of race.  Hunter, 471 
U.S. at 222.  But, it left plaintiffs with a huge burden of proof to demonstrate racial animus 
underlay the disfranchisement legislation, because constitutional claims attacking state 
laws on the theory that they discriminate on the basis of race requires proof that the 
purpose of the legislation is discriminatory.  Mobile, 446 U.S. at 55.  Minority plaintiffs have 
recently used the VRA “effects” language to challenge felon disfranchisement statutes in a 
way which obviated the need to show discriminatory purpose, with mixed results.  
Compare, e.g., Johnson v. Governor of Florida, 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005), and Muntaquin 
v. Combe, 366 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2004) (refusing to apply the VRA to such statutes), with 
Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003) (VRA unambiguously encompasses 
felon disfranchisement statutes).  This article does not address the issue posed in these 
cases, which was the meaning of the legislative prohibition of any state practice that has 
“...the effect of denying the right to vote on the basis of race or color.”  Id. (emphasis added).  
Suffice it to note that, if Richardson were overruled, the issue presented by Johnson, 
Muntaquin, and Farrakhan would probably be mooted, as a practical matter, and many 
felons, not just those from minority groups, would have the right to challenge the statutes 
on a non-racial basis. 
18 Richardson,  418 U.S. at 75. 
19 Id. at 73-74. 
20 Id. at 75. 
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accepted the practice; however, he argued that such approval by no 
means justified the conclusion that the Amendment authorized the 
practice or that it could be used to exempt such practices from 
constitutional scrutiny.21  The precise meaning of “other crime,”22 he 
indicated, was unclear from the legislative history of the provision, 
which suggests that the members of Congress who passed it had given 
the meaning of the phrase almost no consideration whatever.23 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion conceded that the 
legislative history regarding the meaning of the words “or other crime” 
in Section 2 was, “scant indeed,” but went on to state that what little 
there was “indicate[d] that this language was intended by Congress to 
mean what it says.”24  Of course, what it said was simply that states 
would not lose representation if they denied the vote to rebels or those 
guilty of “other crimes.”  How this exemption from Section 2’s coverage 
became an exemption from Section 1 is not explained, except through a 
rhetorical flourish that the framers simply could not have meant to 
prohibit behavior under Section 1 that they had not sanctioned under 
Section 2.25   
III.  THE HISTORY OF SECTION TWO OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
A. The Background of Section 2 
The Fourteenth Amendment, including the “other crime” language 
contained in Section 2, was originally drafted by the Joint Committee of 
                                                 
21 See MANZA & UGGEN, supra note 7, at 41-68 (comparing the felon disfranchisement 
statutes that were common prior to the Civil War to post-Civil War laws).  See also 
Richardson, 418 U.S. at 76.  Justice Marshall’s dissent acknowledged that such statutes 
existed at the time of the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment and may well have been 
approved by many of the people who voted for the amendment.  Id.  But that fact does not 
indicate that the purpose of the amendment was to uphold such limitations on the right to 
vote, nor can it be used to exempt felon disfranchisement laws from strict scrutiny under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id.  Dissenting in Richardson, Justice Marshall conceded that 
one-year durational residency requirements for voting rights were commonplace at the 
time of the Civil War, and indeed approved by Congress in various Reconstruction acts, 
but Marshall noted that the laws had nevertheless been subjected to strict scrutiny in Dunn, 
405 U.S. 330, which found them constitutionally wanting.  Id. 
22 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 43. 
23 Id. at 73.  Justice Marshall stated, “the proposed § 2 went to a joint committee 
containing only the phrase ‘participating in rebellion’ and emerged with ‘or other crime’ 
inexplicably tacked on.”  Id.  Afterwards, the floor debates were found to be similarly 
unilluminating, with absolutely no discussion of why the phrase had been added to the 
proposed amendment with virtually no discussion of its meaning.  Id. 
24 Id. at 43. 
25 See id. at 54-55. 
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Fifteen on Reconstruction.  The committee became the fountainhead of 
both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.  Consisting of six 
Senators and nine Representatives, it was organized in December of 1865 
to assist Congress in framing the debate on how the Union should be 
reconstructed after the Civil War.26   
From beginning to end, discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
insofar as it involved political rights, concerned what Charles Sumner, 
the leading Radical member of the Republican caucus in the Senate, 
called the dual principles of “inclusion” and “exclusion.”  The principles 
focused on the righteous inclusion of newly freed African-Americans in 
the voting population of the newly reconstructed former Confederate 
states, and the exclusion from the franchise of the Southern whites who 
had aided and abetted the late rebellion.27  Because the population in the 
victorious Northern states had not yet fully accepted the principle of 
equal suffrage for both races, it was impossible to directly push for that 
principle until much later.  Only after the nation had become fed up with 
Southern resistance to reconstruction attempts through moderate 
methods, and after the South had flat-out rejected attempts to 
“encourage” the extension of voting rights to black citizens, did the 
North accept the principle of equal suffrage.28 
The immediate occasion for passing Section 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was the final passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, at the 
very end of 1865.29  That provision, of course, ended once and for all the 
                                                 
26 See generally BENJ. B. KENDRICK, JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON 
RECONSTRUCTION (1914). 
27 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2763-64 (1866). 
28 See KENDRICK, supra note 26, at 206 n.1 (noting that at the end of the Civil War, only 
six states had accorded blacks the right to vote, and even in those states, black voters 
sometimes were subjected to special educational or property qualifications).  See generally, 
JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 48-67 (2nd ed. 1994).  It took 
several years of southern recalcitrance and Northern frustration at Southern defiance of 
attempts to reconstruct the Southern states before sufficient political support enabled the 
Radicals to push through the Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibited denial or 
abridgment of the right to vote on account of race or color.  Id.  See WILLIAM GILLETTE, THE 
RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 30-35 (2nd prtg. 
1969) (pointing out that it was the Southern refusal to respond to the incentive to extend 
the franchise to blacks created by Section 2 that led to the movement to pass the Fifteenth 
Amendment in 1868); GEORGE W. JULIAN, POLITICAL RECOLLECTIONS 1840 TO 1872 304 
(1884) (discussing Congressman Julian, a Republican congressman who supported both the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, who recalled that by the Spring of 1867, Section 2 
of the Fourteenth Amendment was “now generally condemned”). 
29 See KORNGOLD, supra note 13, at 229-33.  The Thirteenth Amendment, promulgated in 
early 1865 and ratified by the states by December 15 of that year, abolished slavery.  Id.  See 
also CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess. 531 (1865) (stating that the House passed the 
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institution of slavery.30  An unintentional consequence of its adoption 
was the pro tanto destruction of the “three fifths” rule for apportioning 
voting power to the former slave states thereby enlarging the number of 
seats they would receive in the House of Representatives and the 
Electoral College.31  The Committee of Fifteen submitted several versions 
of what ultimately became the Fourteenth Amendment before getting 
approval of the specific language that was ultimately submitted and 
ratified by the states.  Representative Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania, 
the foremost Radical in the House and the leader of the Committee of 
Fifteen, initiated the debate on what was to become the first version of 
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment by arguing, on December 18, 
1865, that the inevitable abolition of the infamous “three fifths” rule 
would have gigantic ramifications for apportionment once slavery was 
ended and the former rebel states were readmitted to the union.32  In his 
view, readmission of the Southern states to the union required that the 
newly admitted states, at the very least, either fully enfranchise their 
                                                                                                             
amendment on January 31, 1865, the Senate concurred the following day, and Secretary 
Seward proclaimed its passage on December 18, 1865); MCPHERSON, supra note 13, at 6. 
30 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
31 U.S. CONST. art. I.  Section 2 of Article I of the original Constitution provided that 
representatives in the House were to “be apportioned among the several States . . . 
according to their respective Numbers [to be] determined by adding to the whole Number 
of free Persons . . .  three fifths of all other Persons.”  Id.  These “other persons” who 
counted as only “three-fifths” of a person were slaves living almost exclusively in the 
American South and border states, in many of which their numbers approached and in a 
few cases actually exceeded that of the free white population.  See MCPHERSON, supra note 
13, at 125.  At the end of the Civil War, Mississippi and South Carolina had more slaves 
than free whites and blacks combined.  No other state contained a majority of African 
Americans, though several, all in the deep South, had populations in which whites were a 
bare majority.  Id.  According to a table drawn from the 1860 census, the Southern states 
holding the highest percentage of slaves were as follows: 
 
STATE WHITE 
POPULATION 
FREE 
BLACK 
SLAVE 
POPULATION 
TOTAL 
POPULATION 
% 
WHITE 
Alabama 526,271 2,690 435,080 964,201 54.6 
Florida 77,747 932 61,745 140,424 55.4 
Georgia 591,550 3,500 462,198 1,057,286 55.9 
Louisiana 357,486 18,647 331,726 708,002 50.5 
Mississippi 353,899 773 436,631 791,305 44.7 
N. Carolina 629,942 30,463 331,059 992,622 73.2 
S. Carolina 291,300 9,914 402,406 703,708 41.4 
*Virginia 1,047,299 58,042 490,865 1,596,318 65.6 
*The figures for Virginia include the counties of the state that became part of West Virginia 
during the Civil War. 
32 See 2 JAMES E. BLAINE, TWENTY YEARS OF CONGRESS: LINCOLN TO GARFIELD 128-29 
(1886). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2007], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss1/1
2007] Richardson v. Ramirez 9 
black citizens, or suffer the consequence of having their entire black 
population excluded from the count when Congressional seats were 
awarded in the future.33  
                                                 
33 See BLAINE supra note 32 at 128-29.  The Radical Republicans rarely differentiated 
between their own narrow partisan interests and loftier concerns about either protecting 
the Union from further attacks by the former rebels of the South or assisting the newly 
freed former slaves in gaining a full opportunity to participate in American life.  Id.  Often 
they called the Republican Party the Unionist (or simply the Union) Party, and they 
certainly wanted it to retain power over the country after the Civil War was over.  Id.  Near 
the end of the war, President Lincoln and President Andrew Johnson both attempted to 
pull the Union back together through the simple expedient of readmitting to the Union the 
governments of the states that had attempted to secede into the late Confederacy.  Id.  The 
Radical Republicans were dead-set against this policy, in part because they believed it 
would leave the former rebels in a stronger political position than they had enjoyed prior to 
the war, and in part because they increasingly came to understand that returning power to 
the Southern white state governments would frustrate the goal of protecting the newly 
freed slaves and integrating them into American life.  Id.  They accurately perceived that 
black people, if enfranchised, would likely side with their party in national politics.  Id.  
During the Civil War, Charles Sumner argued that the Southern states had “committed 
suicide” when they seceded.  Thaddeus Stevens treated them as conquered provinces, 
entitled to no more solicitude than that accorded to places that had never been admitted to 
the Union, and hence subject to the plenary control of the Congress.  See generally, HERMAN 
BELZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE UNION: THEORY AND PRACTICE DURING THE CIVIL WAR (1969).  
According to Belz, the Radicals were by no means in control of the Republican Party’s 
congressional delegations at the end of the Civil War.  Id. at 303-04.  See KENDRICK, supra 
note 26, at 264-91.  While the “conquered provinces” theory these men espoused was not 
universally held among members of the Republican majority in the Congress, the Radicals 
did gain political traction in the Congress as reports came in to Washington, first from 
General Schurtz (see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1865) (noting introduction of 
General Carl Schurtz’ report)) and later from investigations conducted by subcommittees 
of the Joint Committee of Fifteen of widespread white terrorism against blacks, the 
enactment of onerous “black codes” to frustrate realization of basic civil rights among the 
new freedmen, and generalized repression of the new freedmen by the Southern state 
governments that had been elected by all-white electorates on the basis of pre-Civil War 
voter qualifications.  Id.   See also FRANKLIN, supra note 28, at 59.  The committee called 144 
witnesses, including 77 Southerners living in the South, eight African Americans, and 57 
white Southerners, ranging from Southern loyalists to a few who, like Alexander Stephens 
and Robert E. Lee, had been prominent Confederate leaders.  Id.  The testimony 
demonstrated the necessity for continued army occupation of the South, continued 
operation of the Freedman’s Bureau, and continuing widespread Southern white hostility 
to the Union.  Id.  “The testimony ‘forced’ the committee to conclude that it [would be] 
‘madness and folly’” to permit the Southern states to be reconstructed without radical 
change in their political structures designed to prevent a resurgence of political power 
among the former rebels and virtual re-enslavement of the region’s black population.  Id.; 
see also KENDRICK, supra note 26, at 264-65.  “[T]estimony taken by the joint committee on 
reconstruction [the Committee of Fifteen] . . . served as the raison d’être of the fourteenth 
amendment and as a campaign document for the . . . election of 1866.  150,000 copies were 
printed in order that senators and representatives might distribute them among their 
constituents.”  Id. 
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B. Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment:  The First Attempt 
Shortly after the speech, the Committee of Fifteen prepared and sent 
to Congress Representative Stevens’ proffered version of Section 2 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Stevens had submitted his proposal to the 
committee on January 9, 1866,34 and the Committee adopted the proposal 
on January 31, 1866.35  Its language was sweeping, but was explicitly 
aimed at discouraging the Southern states from denying the right to vote 
on racial grounds.  It read, in pertinent part that: 
Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among the 
several States which may be included within this Union, 
according to their respective numbers, counting the 
whole number of persons in each State . . . . Provided 
that whenever the elective franchise shall be denied or 
abridged in any state, on account of race or color, in the 
election of the members of the most numerous branch of 
the State legislature, or in the election of the electors for 
President or Vice-President of the United States, or 
members of Congress, all persons therein of such race or 
color shall be excluded from the basis of 
representation.36 
There can be no doubt of the political purpose behind this 
legislation.  Many proponents of the bill were quite open about their 
concern regarding the impact of the abolition of slavery on 
apportionment of Congressional power.37 Opponents of the Amendment 
                                                 
34 KENDRICK, supra note 26, at 41. 
35 Id. at 58-60. 
36 Id. at 53, 59. 
37 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 357 (1866).  Representative Conkling of New 
York, a member of the Committee of Fifteen, was much exercised about the “new 
situation” that abolition of the three fifths’ rule would create.  Id.  “The new situation,” he 
said: 
will enable those States when relationships are resumed, to claim 
twenty-eight Representatives beside their just proportion.  Twenty-
eight votes to be cast here and in the Electoral College for those held 
not fit to sit as jurors, not fit to testify in court, not fit to be a plaintiff in 
a suit, not fit to approach the ballot box.  Twenty-eight votes, to be 
more or less controlled by those who once betrayed the Government 
. . . Shall all this be?  Shall four million beings count four millions, in 
managing the affairs of the nation, who are pronounced by their fellow 
beings unfit to participate in administering government in the States 
where they live . . . ?  Shall one hundred and twenty-seven thousand 
white people in New York cast but one vote in this House, and have 
but one voice here, while the same number of white people in 
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were quick to charge that the majority was playing partisan politics with 
the legislation, which was a charge the proponents of the Amendment 
did not shy away from.38  The House of Representatives immediately 
passed the bill as written by an overwhelming vote.  However, the 
                                                                                                             
Mississippi have three votes and three voices. [sic]  Shall the death of 
slavery add two fifths to the entire power which slavery had when 
slavery was living?  Shall one white man have as much share in the 
Government as three other white men merely because he lives where 
blacks outnumber whites two to one? . . . .  Shall such be the reward of 
those who did the foulest and guiltiest act which crimsons the annals 
of recorded time?  No, sir; not if I can help it. 
Id.; cf. statements by: Rep. Bingham, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 431-32 (1866); Rep. 
Julian, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 57-58 (1866); Rep. Stevens, CONG. GLOBE, 
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 536-37 (Jan. 31, 1866); Senator Fessenden, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 
1st Sess. 702-03 (1866). 
38 KENDRICK, supra note 34, at 41.  The supporters of Section 2 were quite open about 
their concern that readmission of the Southern states might weaken the political fortunes of 
the Republican Party.  Id.  See also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 426 (1866).  Their 
partisanship was duly noted by their Democratic opponents.  Id.  For instance, on the 
House floor, Representative Eldridge quoted Thaddeus Stevens as saying that the Southern 
states: 
“ought never to be recognized as capable of acting in the Union, or 
being counted as valid States until the Constitution shall have been so 
amended as to secure perpetual ascendency to the party of the Union 
. . . If they should grant the right of suffrage to persons of color I think 
there would always be Union white men enough in the South, aided 
by the blacks, to divide the representation and thus continue the 
Republican ascendency.”  Here, then, is the motive and purpose of the 
majority of this House.  The States are to be held in the grasp of 
despotic power; the Government is to be revolutionized to secure the 
ascendency of the Republican party. 
Id.  See also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 536 (1866).  Speaking for the Committee of 
Fifteen, Stevens’ response a few days later was equally plain: 
[A]ny man who knows anything about the condition of aspiration and 
ambition for power which exists in the slave States knows that one of 
their chief objects is to rule this country.  It was to ruin it if they could 
not rule it.  They have not been able to ruin it, and now their great 
ambition will be to rule it.  If a State abuses the elective franchise and 
takes it from those who are the only loyal people there, the [proposed] 
Constitution says to such a State, you shall lose power in the halls of 
the nation, and you shall remain what you are, a shriveled and dried-
up nonentity instead of being the lords of creation . . . If they exclude 
the colored population, they will lose at least thirty-five 
Representatives in this Hall.  If they adopt it they will have eighty-
three votes.  Take it away from them and they will have only from 
forty-five to forty-eight votes, all told, in this Hall; and then, sir, let 
them have all the copperhead assistance they can get, and liberty will 
still be triumphant. 
Id. 
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provision died in the Senate, failing to achieve the necessary two-thirds 
majority.39 
C. The Committee’s Second Shot:  The Robert Owen Recommendation that 
Failed 
With the ball back in its court, the Committee of Fifteen set out to 
develop a new strategy.  At an impasse as to what to do in the face of the 
Senate’s refusal to adopt its earlier effort, Representative Stevens was 
open to suggestion, which came in the form of a secret plan and 
compromise offered by Robert Dale Owen, the son of a famous British 
reformer.40  Stevens presented this new version to the Committee of 
Fifteen on April 21, 1866.  In effect, Owen’s plan accomplished several 
objectives.  First, it prohibited discrimination by the state or federal 
government against any person on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude.  Second, it prohibited discrimination in voting 
rights after July 4, 1876.  Third, it prevented, until that time, any class of 
person, as to whom the right to vote should be denied, to be counted in 
determining state representation.  Fourth, it outlawed payment of 
Confederate debts.  Last, it gave Congress the necessary enforcement 
powers.41  The Committee considered Owen’s suggestions and voted, on 
April 23, 1866, to report it to both houses of Congress.  The proposal 
prohibited discrimination in voting rights before July 4, 1876, by 
providing that until that time, “no class of persons, as to the right of any 
of whom to suffrage discrimination shall be made by any state, because 
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, shall be included in the 
basis of representation.”42  Apparently, public opinion, even from the 
perspective of those in the Radicalized Congress of early 1866, was not 
ready to grant full voting rights to America’s black population.43  After 
word leaked out regarding what the proposal was going to look like, 
some Committee members retreated, fearing that the more stringent 
                                                 
39 The vote, taken on March 9, 1866, was 25 in favor, 22 opposed.  See MCPHERSON, supra 
note 13, at 104-05; BLAINE, supra note 32, at 203. 
40 HANS L. TREFOUSSE, THADDEUS STEVENS: NINETEENTH CENTURY EGALITARIAN 184 
(1997). 
41 See TREFOUSSE, supra note 40 at 184; KENDRICK, supra note 26, at 83-84. 
42 KENDRICK, supra note 26, at 84.  See also Robert Dale Owen, Political Results from the 
Varioloid, ATLANTIC MONTHLY 660 (June 1875), http://cdl.library.cornell.edu/cgi-
bin/moa/moa.cgi?notisid=ABK2934-0035-149 (containing Owen’s account of his 
discussions with Thaddeus Stevens, Senator Fessenden, and other Republican leaders). 
43 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
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provision would fail either in Congress or when submitted to the states 
for ratification.44   
D. The Final Version of Section 2 
It was in this context that the Committee decided to reconsider its 
earlier proposal, and ultimately came to adopt the final version of 
Section 2.  On April 28, 1866, Senator George Williams of Oregon 
proposed the apportionment scheme set out in Section 2.45  This final 
version excludes, for apportionment purposes, that part of the 
population that had been previously excluded from voting rights, 
without any specific reference to race, and includes the clause excepting 
from the exclusion those who were deprived of voting rights on account 
of “rebellion, or other crime,”46 which was the language the Richardson 
Court relied on to justify felon disfranchisement statutes.47 
E. The Exception Clause:  Failure to Discover its Full Legislative History 
What happened next lies at the crux of the argument about what the 
“other crime” language of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
means.  As previously noted, both the majority and dissenting opinions 
                                                 
44 See Owen, supra note 42, at 665-66.  Owen’s account is fascinating.  Apparently Senator 
William Fessenden, the committee chair, was absent from the committee the day the vote 
was held approving Owen’s amendment and report to both houses of Congress.  Id.  The 
good senator was reportedly “sick of the varioloid,” a mild form of smallpox.  Id. at 665.  
Owen said Stevens told him that the committee decided that since Fessenden “would 
probably be well in a few days, and that it would seem a lack of courtesy if the most 
important report of the session should be made without his agency,” a brief delay was 
authorized.  Id.  Then, Owen wrote, quoting Stevens: 
Our action on your amendment had, it seems, got noised abroad.  In 
the course of [a] week the members from New York, . . . Illinois, . . . 
and . . . Indiana . . . held, each separately, a caucus to consider whether 
equality of suffrage, present or prospective, ought to form a part of the 
republican programme for the coming canvass.  They were afraid, so 
some of them told me, that if there was ‘a nigger in the wood-pile’ at 
all (that was the phrase), it would be used against them as an 
electioneering handle, and some of them, - hang their cowardice! - 
might lose their elections. . .  Our committee had n’t [sic] backbone 
enough to maintain its ground.  Yesterday. . . your amendment was 
laid on the table, and in the course of the next three hours we contrived 
to patch together . . . [what became § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment]. 
Id. at 666.  Owen then commented, “mortified as I was, I could not help smiling when 
Stevens, after his characteristic fashion, burst forth, ‘Damn the varioloid! It changed the whole 
policy of the country.’”  Id. (emphasis in original). 
45 See KENDRICK, supra note 26, at 102. 
46 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
47 See supra notes 17-26 and accompanying text. 
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in Richardson v. Ramirez indicated there was no evidence as to what 
occurred in the Committee of Fifteen to explain the origin of the 
exclusion clause other than the apparently inexplicable fact that Senator 
Williams suggested it at the April 28, 1866 meeting.  In the Richardson 
majority’s view, this justified a literal application of its language to 
uphold felon disfranchisement laws.  The majority opinion concluded 
that such laws involve denying voting rights on account of “other 
crimes.”48  
Recent scholarship by Jason Morgan-Foster49 indicates the Court 
erred in concluding that there was no history to Section 2’s exclusion 
clause.  In his writings, he has conclusively proven that the claim that no 
other “exclusion clauses” were presented to the Committee of Fifteen 
prior to Senator Williams’ proposal is patently false.  Morgan-Foster 
acknowledges that it is true that the first mention of such a clause in the 
Committee’s Journal refers to Senator Williams’ April 1866 proposal.50  
However, Morgan-Foster’s research shows the Journal is incomplete, and 
utterly fails to account for earlier proposals that were before the 
committee.51   
Well before April 21, 1866, when the Committee took up the 
consideration of what became Section 2, several versions of an 
“exception clause” had been proposed by sundry Congressmen and 
Senators.  As early as March 8, 1866, Representative John Broomall, a 
Republican Congressman from Pennsylvania, had recommended 
removing references to race from Section 2 and replacing them with a 
simple limitation on apportionment when substantial numbers of voting 
age men were deprived of the right to vote.52  Broomall thought it a 
lively question whether former rebels, men, who in his view, might well 
                                                 
48 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 43-44 (1974).  See also id. at 73 (dissenting opinion). 
49 Jason Morgan-Foster, Transnational Judicial Discourse and Felon Disenfranchisement:  Re-
examining Richardson v. Ramirez, 13 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 279 (2005-2006). 
50 See KENDRICK, supra note 26, at 102. 
51 See Morgan-Foster, supra note 49, at 289-91 (describing research concerning other 
bills). 
52 See id. at 290 n.53 (citing ALFRED AVINS, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES 
120 (1967)).  According to Morgan-Foster, Broomall had proposed simply that states should 
lose representation to the same extent that they denied the elective franchise to any male 
citizens of twenty-one years old or older.  Id.  The reason he wanted to avoid directly 
mentioning race was that he feared that the Southern states would use more subtle 
mechanisms, such as literacy tests and poll taxes, to deny the freedmen the franchise.  Id. 
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have forfeited any claim to citizenship because of their “past crimes[,]” 
should be accorded the right to vote.53   
On March 12, 1866, shortly after the Committee’s first proposed 
version of Section 2 failed to gain passage in the Senate, Senator James 
Grimes of Iowa, a Republican committee member, endorsed Broomall’s 
bill.  Grimes introduced it to the Senate as S.R. 42, a substitute for the 
previously submitted H.R. 51, which had already been submitted to 
Congress.  Grimes’ bill proposed that representatives be apportioned 
among the states according to their population, providing that the basis 
of state representation should be reduced in any state in which the 
elective franchise is “denied to any portion of its male citizens above the 
age of twenty-one years, except for crime or disloyalty.”54   In response, 
two Radical Republican Senators, Sumner and Henry Wilson, offered 
differing versions of H.R. 51, with Sumner’s version containing an 
exception clause “for participation in rebellion” and Wilson’s excepting 
citizens “disenfranchised for participation in any rebellion.”55  Later, on 
April 27, 1866, a day before Williams’ proposal was placed before the 
Committee of Fifteen, another proposal, S.R. 76, was introduced in the 
Senate.  This one provided for discounting from apportionment all males 
above the age of 21 “for any cause except insurrection or rebellion 
against the United States.”  Each one of these proposals was ordered 
printed for consideration by the Committee of Fifteen before Senator 
Williams’ intervention on April 28, 1866.   
Morgan-Foster concludes, on the basis of this information, that 
contrary to the view taken by both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Marshall in Richardson v. Ramirez, the “other crime” reference in Section 2 
derives from the reference to treason and other crimes of disloyalty, 
referred to by Representative Broomall on March 8, 1866.  He argues it 
should not be read in the disjunctive to “rebellion” in Section 2’s 
exception clause dealing with “rebellion or other crime.”56  In effect, 
Senator Williams’ intervention in Committee on April 28, 1866, was the 
culmination of a series of proposals, each meant to except from the count 
                                                 
53 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1263-64 (1866).  After a long speech in which he 
mentioned treason or crimes of rebellion at least seven times, Broomall concluded that the 
Government should still allow the people of the former rebel states to create new state 
governments and regain entry into the union, except “as far as [the citizens of the rebel 
states] have not been disqualified by treason.”  Id. at 1264. 
54 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1320 (1866). 
55 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1321 (1866). 
56 Morgan-Foster, supra note 49, at 291. 
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people guilty, not of crimes generally, but only of crimes involved in the 
rebellion.   
F. The Connection Between Section 2 and Radical Proposals to Strip Former 
Confederates of the Right to Vote:  Herein of “Inclusion” and “Exclusion” 
Morgan-Foster’s argument need not rest solely upon the fact that 
other versions of the exception clause were offered earlier to the 
Committee of Fifteen.  Particularly, it is important to note two facts that 
Morgan-Foster does not emphasize.  First, no exclusion clause was 
ultimately accepted until after Section 2 had been watered down to 
eliminate any specific reference to race.  Second, the exclusion clause was 
first accepted in the context of Congressional efforts to disfranchise 
white men who had aided and abetted the Southern rebellion.  The 
problem of non-racial limitation on apportionment—a denial of political 
power to any region that denied the right to vote to significant numbers 
of people for any reason—created a serious difficulty when it was 
conjoined with the plans of Radical Republicans to strip voting rights 
from those who had given aid and comfort to the recent rebellion.  It was 
this difficulty that led directly to the adoption of the “rebellion and other 
crime” exception clause.  Consideration of this difficulty is necessary to 
judge how the exception clause should be construed. 
As previously noted, Congressional proponents of the Fourteenth 
Amendment were ardent supporters of what Senator Sumner, a Radical 
Republican leader in the Senate, had called the principles of “inclusion” 
and “exclusion.”57  As stated, this principle involved the dual strategies 
for enhancing Republican political power, and protecting the newly 
freed former slaves by including black participation in the political 
process while excluding unreconstructed whites from such 
participation.58  The framers of Section 2’s apportionment plan wanted to 
use the clause to encourage Southern states to give blacks the right to 
vote.  They hoped to accomplish the second goal by passing a 
companion section, Section 3, aimed at weakening unreconstructed 
white voting power. 
The final version of Section 2 that came out of Committee differed 
from earlier versions of the apportionment clause in three ways.  First, 
for the first time, proponents of a new method of apportionment came 
up with a proposal that avoided any direct mention of providing voting 
rights to freedmen.  Instead of cutting off apportionment for denials of 
                                                 
57 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2763-64 (1866). 
58 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
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voting rights tied to race, it purported to cut off apportionment for 
denial of the vote for virtually any reason.  Second, also for the first time, 
the apportionment penalty contained an exception clause, the “except for 
participation in rebellion or other crime” language that was the subject-
matter of the Richardson decision.  Finally, the new proposal substantially 
softened the penalty for denying the franchise by limiting the loss of 
representation to the percentage of a state’s adult male population that 
was actually deprived of the right to vote, rather than penalizing any 
state that discriminated against blacks by removing from its calculus the 
state’s entire African-American population.  
A number of supporters of the new Section 2 voiced concern that the 
clause made no mention of race, and weakened the “penalty” Southern 
states would suffer should they discriminate against prospective black 
voters.59   
G. Section 3:  Exclusion Through Constitutional Amendment 
At first glance, the Committee’s final version of Section 2 appears to 
have been a substantial retreat from what the Committee had offered in 
January, and had tentatively passed just a few days earlier.  However, it 
was not as big a retreat from earlier principles as it first appears.  The 
Committee members were determined to see that the new freedmen 
were not trampled upon by their former masters, and they remained 
greatly concerned that the former rebels, once the three fifths rule was 
abolished, would return to Congress with more power than they had 
                                                 
59 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2332-33 (1866).  Senator Fessenden of Maine, 
the chair of the Committee of Fifteen, noted that the proposal was a compromise that was 
necessitated by the need to secure passage of the amendment in committee and later get 
passage before both houses of Congress and ultimately among the states.  Id.  See also 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866).  Thaddeus Stevens admitted that: 
[i]t falls far short of my wishes, but it fulfills my hopes. I believe it is all 
that can be obtained in the present state of public opinion.  Not only 
Congress but the several States are to be consulted.  Upon a careful 
survey of the whole ground, we did not believe that nineteen of the 
loyal States could be induced to ratify any proposition more stringent 
than this 
Id.  Many members of Congress would have preferred granting outright the ballot to the 
new freedmen to the apportionment scheme contained in Section 2, but they swallowed 
their principles and strongly supported the compromise.  See, e.g., Remarks of:  
Representative Kelley, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2467-69 (1866); Representative 
Broomall, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2498-99 (1866); Representative Boutwell, 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2507-09 (1866); Representative Eliot, CONG. GLOBE, 39th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 2511-12 (1866); Representative Farnsworth, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 2539-40 (1866); Representative Longyear, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2536-37 
(1866); Representative Beaman, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2537 (1866). 
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enjoyed prior to the Civil War.  Thus, on the same day that they 
withdrew the original Owen proposal and adopted Senator Williams’ 
more generalized rule regarding apportionment, they also proposed a 
new Section 3 for the Fourteenth Amendment, this one aimed at 
implementing Senator Sumner’s “exclusion” principle by stripping white 
confederates of the right to vote.60  This proposed section would prohibit, 
until July 4, 1870, “all persons who voluntarily adhered to the late 
insurrection, giving it aid and comfort, . . . from [exercising] the right to 
vote for Representatives in Congress and for electors for President and 
Vice-President of the United States.”61   After replacing the prohibition 
against racial discrimination with what became Section 1,62 the 
committee voted to report the entire amendment for adoption and 
ratification by the states.63  
The pairing of the newly proposed Section 3 with the changes in 
Section 2, particularly the addition of Section 2’s new exception clause, 
was unlikely to have been adventitious.  While it is difficult to evaluate 
precisely what percentage of the Southern white electorate would have 
been disfranchised had Section 3 ultimately been adopted, it is likely that 
the number would have greatly diminished Southern representation in 
Congress.64  If it were to pass, some sort of exception clause would be 
                                                 
60 KENDRICK, supra note 26, at 104-05. 
61 Id. at 53-57; see also FRANKLIN, supra note 28, at 43.  The proposal was directly related 
to the fact that, in 1865, Southern states undergoing reconstruction under President 
Johnson’s more lenient regime, with electorates substantially identical to those that had 
voted for elected officials before the Civil War, had elected a large number of ex-
Confederates to political office.  Id.  “The Vice-President of the Confederacy, four 
Confederate generals, five Confederate colonels, six Confederate cabinet officers, and fifty-
eight Confederate congressmen were elected to the Thirty-ninth Congress, which met in 
December, 1865.”  Id.  Franklin points out that this “bold” action by the ex-Confederate 
states embarrassed the President.  Id.  The Congress refused to seat the people so elected, 
thus beginning the battle that wrested control of the Reconstruction process from the 
executive to the legislative branch. 
62 KENDRICK, supra note 26, at 106.  In addition, the committee replaced the then pending 
version of Section 1, which prohibited racial discrimination by the federal or state 
governments, with the now familiar Section 1, prohibiting state action involving the 
privileges or immunities of United States citizenship and guaranteeing due process and 
equal protection rights.  Id. 
63 KENDRICK, supra note 26, at 116-17.  In addition to these clauses, the proposed 
amendment included a provision forbidding payment of the Confederate debt (Section 4) 
and an enforcement clause (Section 5).  Id. 
64 See 1 BLAINE, TWENTY YEARS OF CONGRESS:  LINCOLN TO GARFIELD 560 (1884).  One 
must remember that, before and after the Civil War, only adult male citizens were accorded 
the right to vote.  Id.  In the South, it has been reported that nearly every white man capable 
of bearing arms rendered service to the Confederate army during the Civil War.  Id. 
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necessary, since the disfranchisement of large numbers of white voters 
would certainly have had an impact on representation. 
The pairing of Sections 2 and 3 in the Fourteenth Amendment draft 
that came out of the Committee of Fifteen goes a long way toward 
explaining the purpose of the exception clause.  Looking at the world 
from the perspective of people in 1866, at the time the Fourteenth 
Amendment was drafted, the only classes to whom voting rights might 
be denied conceivably large enough to affect the non-racial 
apportionment scheme of Section 2, were (1) the group of black voters 
that the framers wanted enrolled and (2) the unreconstructed white 
voters the framers hoped to disfranchise.  This limitation on voting 
power of the Southern states was clearly aimed at protecting African-
American voters, even if the language did not explicitly mention them as 
a protected class.  In 1866, when the drafters were at work, what group, 
other than potential victims of Southern unreconstructed rebels, was 
anticipated to both (a) be denied voting rights and (b) be large enough to 
affect apportionment?  The obvious answer is the former rebels that the 
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment anticipated disfranchising 
through Sumner’s policy of exclusion.  This combination of facts, the 
planned disfranchisement of those guilty of disloyalty and the fact of 
their number, explains who the framers had in mind when they wrote 
the exception clause:  those likely to lose voting rights because they had 
aided and abetted the Confederate rebellion or committed other crimes 
against the Union during the Civil War or in its aftermath.  As Lord Coke 
explained over four hundred years ago, the “true meaning” of legislation 
like this requires consideration of “the mischief or defect” for which the 
law otherwise would not provide the “remedy the Legislature has 
appointed . . .” and “the reason of the remedy.”65   Without the exception 
clause, the anticipated disfranchisement of white voters occasioned by 
Section 3, when combined with the apportionment scheme of Section 2, 
would have led to a radical diminution of voting power of the newly 
admitted Southern states.  To remedy this problem, the exception clause 
had to be inserted. 
The combination of Sections 2 and 3 was ardently supported by the 
Radical members of the Republican caucus, though from the other side it 
appeared unduly punitive and anti-democratic.  Thaddeus Stevens, one 
                                                 
65 Heydon’s Case, (1584) Easter Term, 26 Eliz. I (Exch), reprinted in G.A. ENDLICH, A 
COMMENTARY ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 35-36 (1888).  See also 1 THE SELECTED 
WRITINGS OF SIR EDWARD COKE 78, 80 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003) (reporting the opinion, 
with Latin sentences fully translated). 
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of the major architects of the Fourteenth Amendment, continued to 
believe that the apportionment clause, even in its new format, remained 
by far the “most important” part of the proposed Amendment.66  While 
it is difficult to evaluate precisely how many Southern whites would 
have been temporarily disfranchised by the measure, its impact would 
have been considerable. 
Viewed in context, the final version of Section 2 was not much of a 
retreat at all.  To secure Republican rule, the Radical Republicans 
believed that they needed to encourage black voting in the South, as a 
counterweight to the anti-Unionist sentiments of its white population, 
and to strip as many former rebels of the right to vote as was politically 
feasible.  The proposed version of the Fourteenth Amendment that came 
out of committee on April 28, 1866, contained elements of both tactics:  
Section 3 would weaken the former rebels political grip in the newly 
reconstructed Southern states by temporarily disfranchising many of the 
Southern whites and Section 2 would encourage extension of the vote to 
black freedmen without offending those Northern “moderates” who 
were not yet fully ready to eliminate racial limitations on the franchise in 
the Northern states. 
Supporters of the proposal recognized that while Section 2 was likely 
to pass, Section 3 might be considered unduly punitive.  Nevertheless, 
                                                 
66 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866).  He went on to say: 
The effect of this provision will be either to compel the States to grant 
universal suffrage or  so to shear them of their power as to keep them 
forever in a hopeless minority in the national Government, both 
legislative and executive. . . . Thus shorn of their power, they would 
soon become restive.  Southern pride would not long brook a hopeless 
minority. 
Id.  See also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766-67 (1866).  Both supporters and 
opponents of Section 2 were aware of its likely impact on partisan and sectional politics.  Id.  
Senator Howard, who temporarily became floor leader for the Joint Resolution when 
Senator Fessenden, the Committee of Fifteen chair, who was forced by illness to stay away 
from the debate, was quite clear that, since the committee doubted the Southern states 
would extend the right to vote to blacks, the Southern states would pay a big price in terms 
of representation in Congress and the electoral college.  Id.  See also CONG. GLOBE, 39th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 2939 (1866).  The Democratic opponents of Section 2 were clearly aware of 
its potential political impact, and complained mightily of about how partisan it was.  Id.  
For example, Senator Hendricks argued that the proposal ultimately put before the Senate 
was being rammed through the Congress for party advantage, lest its failure bring 
disastrous consequences for the Republicans in the fall elections; he noted wryly that there 
were so few blacks in New England and New York that Section 2 would not affect 
representation of there while it would “throw public affairs into their [the black voters’] 
hands” in the South.  Id. 
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they were prepared to support it ardently.  Thaddeus Stevens started out 
the debate in the House by admitting: 
[the] third section may encounter more difference of 
opinion here [than Section 2].  Among the people I 
believe it will be the most popular of all the provisions; 
it prohibits rebels from voting for members of Congress 
and electors of President until 1870.  My only objection 
to it is that it is too lenient.  I know that there is a morbid 
sensibility, sometimes called mercy, which affects a few 
of all classes, from the priest to the clown, which has 
more sympathy for murderer on the gallows than for his 
victim.  I hope I have a heart as capable of feeling for 
human woe as others. I have long since wished that 
capital punishment were abolished.  But I never 
dreamed that all punishment could be dispensed with 
. . . Anarchy, treason, and violence would reign 
triumphant . . . .  I would be glad to see it extended to 
1876, and to include all State and municipal as well as 
national elections.  In my judgment we do not 
sufficiently protect the loyal men of the rebel states from 
the vindictive persecutions of their victorious rebel 
neighbors.  Still I will move no amendment, nor vote for 
any, lest the whole fabric should tumble to pieces.67 
Other House members took much the same view.68  At the end of the 
House debate, Stevens was adamant: 
[The Democratic] side of the House will be filled with 
yelling secessionists and hissing copperheads.  Give us 
the third section or give us nothing.  Do not balk us with 
the pretense of an amendment which throws the Union 
into the hands of the enemy before it becomes 
consolidated.  Gentlemen say I speak of party.  
                                                 
67 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2460 (1866) (emphasis in original). 
68 See, e.g., remarks of Congressman Kelley, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2468 
(1866) (asking rhetorically whether “magnanimity requires us to hand the Government 
over immediately to the vanquished but unconverted rebels of the South,” concluding that 
Section 2 was required lest “the pardoned rebels of the South include in the basis of 
representation four million people to whom they deny political rights” and that Section 3 
was needed to prevent from “govern[ing] this country . . . [t]he men who for more than 
four years sustained bloody war for its overthrow”); Congressman Schenck, CONG. GLOBE, 
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2470 (1866) (the Southern whites have “flung away their right to 
representation”). 
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Whenever party is necessary to sustain the Union I say 
rally to your party and save the Union.  I do not hesitate 
to say at once, that section is there to save or destroy the 
Union party, is there to save or destroy the Union by the 
salvation or destruction of the Union party . . . . 
Gentlemen tell us it is too strong - too strong for what?  
Too strong for their stomachs, but not for the people.  
Some say it is too lenient.  It is too lenient for my hard 
heart.  Not only to 1870, but to 18070, every rebel who 
shed the blood of loyal men should be prevented from 
exercising any power in this Government.  That, even, 
would be too mild a punishment for them.69 
The resolution passed the House that day by a resounding vote, 128 to 
37,70 and was sent to the Senate, where debate opened on May 23, 1866.71 
Section 2 of the proposed Amendment sailed through without much 
opposition.  Section 3, however, foundered almost immediately.  Seeing 
the two sections as representing two sides of the same “inclusion-
exclusion” coin,  Sumner moved to delay the vote because he believed 
the tide of public opinion would run more favorably toward full passage 
of a vigorous Amendment as reports of Congressional investigations of 
what was happening in the unreconstructed South gained currency.72  
Exhausted from the long legislative battle, and believing that quite 
enough time had elapsed since the matter had been reported out on 
April 30, 1866, the Senate rejected his ministrations and determined to 
take up the debate almost immediately.  In the absence of Senator 
Fessenden, chair of the Committee of Fifteen, on account of a recurrence 
of the varioloid, Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan temporarily became 
floor manager for the proposal.  While ardently supporting Section 2, he 
made no bones about the fact that he actually opposed Section 3.  He 
stated, “I did not favor this section of the amendment in the committee.  I 
do not believe, if adopted, it will be of any particular benefit to the 
                                                 
69 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2544 (1866). 
70 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2545 (1866). 
71 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2764 (1866). 
72 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2763-65 (1866). 
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country.”73  His preference, he indicated, would be to prevent those who 
had participated in the rebellion from holding state or federal office.74 
As if on cue, Senator Clark of New Hampshire offered an 
Amendment for Section 3, eliminating the disfranchisement of those who 
had supported the Confederacy and replacing it with a prohibition on 
federal office holding by those who had previously taken the oath to 
support the United States government, and then voluntarily supported 
the rebellion.75  Howard said he would accept Clark’s proposed 
substitute language.76 
The Senate conducted almost no debate on the Fourteenth 
Amendment after its initial introduction on May 23.  After discussion the 
following day, it was taken off the agenda until May 29, 1866, and 
during the hiatus, Republican senators caucused several times to work 
out compromise language regarding the Amendment.  After further 
delays, the compromise language was put to a vote and passed the 
Senate on June 8, 1866.77  The House passed the revised resolution on 
June 13, 1866,78 with only Thaddeus Stevens publicly expressing dismay 
at the Senate’s weakening of the Amendment.79 
                                                 
73 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2767-68 (1866).  See KENDRICK, supra note 26, at 
105-06, 311 n.4 (pointing out Howard’s statement of how his vote in committee was false). 
74 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2768 (1866).  His reasoning was that the provision 
would be inadequate to prevent control of the South by former rebel leaders because they 
would still have the franchise in state and local elections and could thereby influence 
elections not only locally but also for the Senate and presidential electors.  Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id.; see also KENDRICK, supra note 26, at 308.  The extent to which this was a total sellout 
of the committee’s position is hard to discern.  Id.  According to Kendrick, Section 3 was 
doomed almost from the outset.  Id.  He reports that: 
there were enough Republicans opposed to the . . . section, who, 
together with the Democrats, could have stricken it out [in the House], 
had not about a dozen of the latter believed it good party tactics to 
make the whole amendment as obnoxious as possible, and so voted 
with the radicals rather than with the conservatives.  As it was, the 
section was retained [in the House version of the resolution] by the 
narrow margin of 84 to 79.  Among the Republicans who favored its 
elimination were [six of the nine House members] of the committee.  
All other Republican members of the committee voted for its retention 
as did also . . . two Democratic tacticians . . . 
Id. (citation omitted). 
77 Id. at 312-19. 
78 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3149 (1866). 
79 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3148 (1866).  “The third section has been 
wholly changed,” he said.  Id.  After pointing out the difference between the House and 
Senate versions, he went on: 
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H. The Principles of Inclusion and Exclusion After the Fourteenth 
Amendment 
The Radical Republicans were frustrated in the end by the 
conservatism of the Senate, but their program of “inclusion and 
exclusion” did not end with the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Instead, it continued for some time after the war ended.  However, the 
principle of “exclusion” failed well before Reconstruction ended and the 
principle of “inclusion” foundered after Reconstruction, only to be 
reconstructed in the late twentieth century with the passage of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965.   
But the Radical Republicans who controlled Congress in the 
immediate aftermath of the Civil War did not give up on these principles 
with the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Almost as soon as 
Congress proposed that the states ratify the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Radicals began to push both enfranchisement of black voters in the 
former Confederate states and disfranchisement of rebels who had 
threatened the Union through other means.  This attack proceeded on 
two fronts:  through passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, directly 
prohibiting denial of voting rights on account of race, and thus 
preempting the operation of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment; 
and more immediately through enactment of Reconstruction legislation, 
providing for military supervision throughout the former Confederacy 
of voter enrollment and requiring both the enfranchisement of black 
males and the disenfranchisement of whites who had voluntarily aided 
the rebel cause. 
The story of the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment has been well 
told elsewhere.  The former Confederate states were given a chance to 
voluntarily enroll black voters in compliance with Section 2.  Their 
response was a resounding, unanimous rejection of the opportunity to 
avoid Section 2 sanctions.  As one commentator points out, after gauging 
the Southern reaction to the Fourteenth Amendment, former aficionados 
of Section 2 began to perceive it a total failure and decided stronger 
                                                                                                             
This I cannot look upon as an improvement.  It opens the elective 
franchise to such as the States choose to admit.  In my judgment it 
endangers the Government of the country, both State and national; and 
may give the next Congress and President to the reconstructed rebels.  
With their enlarged basis of representation, and exclusion of the loyal 
men of color from the ballot-box, I see no hope of safety unless in the 
prescription of proper enabling acts, which shall do justice to the 
freedmen and enjoin enfranchisement as a condition-precedent. 
Id. 
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medicine was needed to assure enfranchisement of the South’s newly 
freed former slaves.  Thaddeus Stevens started to draft a new 
Constitutional Amendment to enfranchise black voters before the 
Fourteenth Amendment was even ratified.80  The passage of the Fifteenth 
Amendment was believed by its supporters to entirely supersede Section 
2, which was essentially rendered a dead letter by passage of the 
Fifteenth Amendment.81  In effect, Section 2 was repealed and replaced 
by the new Fifteenth Amendment, which, as one commentator points 
out, was stronger, broader, and more easily enforced than Section 2.82 
The Reconstruction statutes were also instrumental in implementing 
the “inclusion/exclusion policy,” inherent in the Joint Committee’s 
proposed Fourteenth Amendment.  In December 1866, Congress first 
tested the waters with legislation designed to extend voting rights to 
black residents of the District of Columbia.  Congressional power 
became obvious when Congress easily overrode President Johnson’s 
veto of the measure.83   
Much stronger medicine soon followed.  Over other presidential 
vetoes, the Thirty-Ninth Congress passed the Reconstruction Act on 
March 2, 1867.  The Fortieth Congress added a Supplementary 
Reconstruction Act three weeks later, on March 23, 1867.84  The statutes 
divided the South into five military districts, each governed by an Army 
general to be appointed by the President.  All state and local 
governments were to be “provisional only,” subject entirely to the 
authority of the national government.85  Each state was to call a 
Constitutional convention, to which delegates would be elected, white 
and black, except for those whites rendered ineligible for office under the 
terms of the Fourteenth Amendment.86  These conventions had to grant 
                                                 
80 See GILLETTE, supra note 28, at 34; JULIAN, supra note 28, at 304.  George W. Julian, a 
Republican congressman who supported both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, 
recalled that by the Spring of 1867, Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment was “now 
generally condemned.”  JULIAN, supra note 28, at 304. 
81 See Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction: Felon Disenfranchisement, and the Right to Vote: Did 
the Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 92 GEO. L.J. 259, 272-75 
(2003-2004) (citing GEORGE S. BOUTWELL, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AT THE 
END OF THE FIRST CENTURY 389 (1895)) (concluding that passage of the Fifteenth 
Amendment superceded Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment); BLAINE, supra note 32, at 
418 (same); 1 JOHN SHERMAN, RECOLLECTIONS OF FORTY YEARS IN THE HOUSE, SENATE AND 
CABINET 450 (1895) (same)). 
82 See Chin, supra note 81. 
83 FRANKLIN, supra note 28, at 70. 
84 See MCPHERSON, supra note 13, at 191-94 (providing the full text of these laws. 
85 FAWN M. BRODIE, THADDEUS STEVENS: SCOURGE OF THE SOUTH 303 (1959). 
86 Id. 
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suffrage to adult black males of one year’s residency, but could 
disfranchise former supporters of the Confederate cause.87  The 
Constitutions they produced had to be approved by the same electorate 
that chose the delegates and then forwarded to Congress for approval.88  
In order to gain readmission to the Union, the new state 
governments would have to approve the Fourteenth Amendment.89  
Section 5 of the Act of March 2, 1867, provided that the convention had 
to be elected by “delegates elected by the male citizens of [the] State 
twenty-one years old and upward, of whatever race, color, or previous 
condition, who have been resident . . . for one year . . . except such as 
may be disfranchised for participation in the rebellion, or for felony at 
common law . . . [,]” or a person excluded from federal office by Section 
3.90  Section 1 of the March 23, 1867 statute, called for federal registration 
of voters for the conventions and precluded from registration, inter alia, 
those who refused to swear or affirm that they had not “given aid or 
comfort to the enemies” of the United States.91  The precise impact of this 
oath on the white electorate in the South is unclear,92 but there is no 
question that it was significant, at least in some states.  As one historian 
reports:  
                                                 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 See MCPHERSON, supra note 13, at 192. 
91 Id.  The statute was ambiguous.  Id.  It required that persons registered take a loyalty 
oath swearing or affirming that the prospective voter had “never been a member of any 
State legislature, nor held any executive or judicial office in any State and afterwards 
engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or given aid or comfort to 
the enemies thereof . . .”  Id.  See also FRANKLIN, supra note 28, at 18 (noting that this so-
called “iron-clad oath,” which looked backward as well as forward in terms of loyalty, had 
been first proposed as part of ill-fated legislation called the Wade-Davis Bill, in 1864). 
92 See FRANKLIN, supra note 28, at 99.  Of course it is difficult to ascertain to what extent 
the oath was successful in excluding Southern whites who gained registration.  Id.  First, 
given the questionable efficiency of both the machinery and the personnel involved in the 
registration process, many clearly ineligible people probably were registered.  Id. at 99.  
Second, there is a serious question regarding how many of the Southern whites who took 
the oath did so in good faith.  One difficulty involved the fact that across the South 
procedures varied tremendously regarding how to enforce the rules.  Some of the generals 
appointed to administer Reconstruction ordered that registrars refuse to register those who 
were not taking the oath in good faith.  This led President Johnson to order, in June 1867, 
that those who took the oath should be “judges of their own honesty.”  Id. at 78, 99.  On 
July 19, 1867, Congress responded by passing legislation empowering registration boards 
to deny registration to persons who were not taking the oath in good faith.  Id. at 72.  That 
same month, President Johnson removed several generals who had most vigorously 
enforced the limitations on white registration, including General Sheridan, in control of 
Louisiana and Texas, replacing them with people more sympathetic to Democratic - and 
Southern white - interests.  Id. at 78. 
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In some states the percentage of white disfranchisement 
was much higher than in others because of the political 
sentiments of the general in charge.  General Sheridan, 
in command over Louisiana, interpreted the oath so 
stringently that the New Orleans Times estimated that 
half the white males were barred from the polls, 
including all veterans and Democratic office holders.  
General Schofield in Virginia, on the other hand, was 
lenient, holding, for example, that “giving aid and 
comfort to the enemy” did not mean supplying charity 
but furnishing horses and guns.  In Tennessee the new 
Radical constitution disfranchised more than half the 
white male citizens . . . . [African American] voters 
outnumbered the whites in five states - Florida, 
Alabama, South Carolina, Mississippi, and Louisiana - 
though only in the latter three did they number 50 per 
cent or more of the population.93 
In several others their numbers came close to the number of white 
voters, substantially outstripping the black percentage of the general 
population.94  Overall, when voter registration was completed for the 
new state constitutional conventions, in the ten former Confederate 
states, approximately 1,363,000 people qualified as voters, of whom 
660,000 were white and 703,400 were African American.95    
                                                 
93 BRODIE, supra note 85, at 314-15 (citations omitted). 
94 Id. at 315.  Brodie reports that blacks made up forty-nine percent of the voters but only 
forty-four per cent of the population in Georgia; and forty-seven percent of the voters in 
Virginia, a substantially higher percentage that was the black part of that state’s general 
population.  Id. 
95 FRANKLIN, supra note 28, at 79.  The whites who qualified included Northerners who 
had taken up residence in the South as well as native Southerners who passed the ironclad 
oath requirement.  Id. at 85.  Franklin reports that registration figures for whites compare 
quite favorably with figures indicating that 721,000 whites had voted in these states in the 
1860 election, although he concedes that the number of post-war white registrants includes 
a number of Northerners and Union army personnel who registered in the Southern states.  
Id. at 80.  Franklin excludes Tennessee from the states he considers subject to Radical 
Reconstruction.  Id. at 190.  See also MCPHERSON, supra note 13, at 27, 152.  Tennessee made 
no undertaking to enfranchise its black citizens, but it did exclude certain classes of white 
males from the franchise who had been identified with the Confederate cause, renounced 
slavery and the Confederate debt, and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, and under 
these conditions Congress accepted Tennessee back into the Union in July 1866, nearly two 
years prior to readmission of other members of the Confederacy.  See also FRANKLIN, supra 
note 28, at 224 (noting that  each of the other states was subjected to more stringent 
conditions). 
Bourne: Richardson v. Ramirez: A Motion to Reconsider
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
28 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
  
Ultimately, the effort to disfranchise former rebels failed.  Whatever 
the Radicals in Congress had hoped would occur in the South, there is no 
question that the Reconstruction conventions that ultimately refashioned 
the Southern state governments, in no way represented “black rule.”  
The new electorate, consisting as it did of newly freed blacks, loyalist 
whites of both Northern and Southern origin, and those whites who 
dishonestly slipped through the loyalty oath barrier, was certainly very 
different in nature from the pre-Civil War electorate.  However, they 
were not bent on excluding local whites from participating in the 
political process of the new South.  Only in two Southern constitutional 
conventions did blacks come close to a majority.96  Moreover, the black 
politicians of the New South generally favored reconciliation with the 
white people who were their neighbors,, and almost immediately began 
to take steps to remove political disabilities from whites.97  After all, 
unlike the Radical Republicans in the Congress, the Southern blacks 
                                                 
96 See FRANKLIN, supra note 28, at 102 (setting forth the data in the table below): 
MEMBERSHIP IN STATE CONVENTIONS 1867-1868 
STATE BLACK NATIVE 
WHITE 
NORTHERN 
WHITE 
TOTAL 
WHITE 
TOTAL 
MEMBERSHIP 
Alabama 18 
(17%) 
59 (55%)  31 (28%)  90 (83%) 108 (100%) 
Arkansas 8 (13%) 35 (52%) 23 (35%) 58 (87%) 66 (100%) 
Florida 18 
(40%) 
12 (27%) 15 (33%) 27 (60%) 45 (100%) 
Georgia 33 
(19%) 
128 (74%) 9 (7%) 137 (81%) 170 (100%) 
Louisiana 49 
(50%) 
* * 49 (50%) 98 (100%) 
Mississippi 17 
(17%) 
29 (29%) 54 (54%) 83 (83%) 100 (100%) 
N. 
Carolina 
15 
(11%) 
100 (75%) 18 (14%) 118 (89%) 133 (100%) 
S. Carolina 76 
(61%) 
27 (22%) 21 (17%) 48 (39%) 124 (100%) 
Virginia 25 
(24%) 
33 (31%) 47 (45%) 80 (76%) 105 (100%) 
Texas 9 (10%) * *81 (90%)  90 (100%) * 
* Indicates that a further breakdown is unavailable 
Only South Carolina elected a black majority to the state constitutional convention.  
Louisiana’s even division between the races was by agreement, not through the electoral 
process.  Id. at 101. 
97 Id. at 90-91.  For example, in his first speech before the South Carolina convention, 
Beverly Nash, a black leader, “asserted that the Southern white man was the ‘true friend of 
the black man.’ [Nash] point[ed] to the banner containing the words ‘United we stand, 
divided we fall . . .’”  Id.  Thereafter several South Carolina blacks presented a resolution 
asking Congress to remove all political disabilities from the whites, and it was passed.  Id. 
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realized that they would have to live for the foreseeable future with their 
white neighbors.  In understanding the extent of white power and 
influence, they probably understood that any attempt to dominate them, 
even if possible in the short run, would in the long term end disastrously 
for them.  
IV.  CAN FELON DISFRANCHISEMENT STATUTES SURVIVE STRICT SCRUTINY? 
As pointed out earlier in this Article, the Richardson Court held that 
the exception clause of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
authorized states to adopt felon disfranchisement statutes, and, thus, 
obviated the need to apply the compelling governmental interest test to 
felon disfranchisement.98  Assuming arguendo that Richardson’s 
construction of Section 2 is in error, the question remains whether felon 
disfranchisement statutes would likely survive the strict scrutiny 
normally applied to restrictions on the fundamental right to vote? 
Justice Marshall certainly believed felon disfranchisement statutes 
would fail to survive the strict scrutiny analysis.99  Additionally, under 
the reading herein given to the exception clause of Section 2, only those 
denied voting rights for treason or other crimes of disloyalty could be 
outright denied the right to vote under Section 2.100  If a state denied the 
right to vote to those found guilty of voting fraud, perhaps the denial 
might pass scrutiny in light of the state’s need to prevent election-
tampering.  But, as Justice Marshall pointed out, most state statutes cover 
many crimes other than election tampering, and thus cannot be justified 
on the basis that they are needed to assure honest elections.101  If a state 
tried to justify denial of the right to vote to persons who had previously 
committed major crimes on the theory that otherwise such people might 
take over the electoral process and elect bad candidates who might 
undermine the rule of law, it would be, in effect, denying the right to 
vote because of disapproval of the policies citizens might choose.  Surely 
                                                 
98 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
99 See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 77-83 (1974) (dissenting opinion). 
100 See Morgan-Foster, supra note 49, at 317. 
101 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 79-80.  Justice Marshall believed that such statutes would fail 
because they are not the least restrictive means of preventing vote fraud.  Id.  But even if 
that were conceded, as he also pointed out, the state’s legitimate interest in preventing 
voting fraud is ill served by most felon disfranchisement statutes, which he found both 
over-inclusive and under-inclusive.  Id.  As he pointed out, on their face most cover many 
crimes other than voting fraud.  And, because in most states vote fraud crimes are 
misdemeanors only, those with proven disposition to interfere with the honesty of elections 
are not even covered by the statutes.  Id. 
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this would be a seriously defective argument in a system whose 
legitimacy turns on popular sovereignty.102  
Of course, the Supreme Court would ultimately become the final 
arbiter of whether and to what extent felon disfranchisement statutes 
could pass strict scrutiny, and it is somewhat presumptuous to prejudge 
the full panoply of cases that may arise.  However, it does seem pretty 
clear that many such statutes would be at best problematic under such 
an analysis.103 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court erred in concluding in Richardson v. Ramirez that 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s exclusion clause of Section 2 authorized 
state enactment and enforcement of felon disfranchisement statutes.  
When considered in light of its legislative history and purpose, the 
exclusion clause had nothing to do with felon disfranchisement statutes.  
Instead, its only purpose was to prevent diminution of power given 
states through apportionment schemes, which would be occasioned by 
the framers’ plans to strip political power from those who had 
participated in trying to undo the Union in the Civil War.  Exclusion 
clauses that were proposed prior to the final version included in Section 
2 explicitly limited exclusion to those who had participated in the 
rebellion or related crimes.  There is no discussion of precisely how the 
language was changed to seemingly cover other crimes unrelated to the 
rebellion.  There was no need to attach an exclusion clause to earlier 
versions of the apportionment scheme because it would only come into 
force if the state denied voting rights to citizens on account of race.  Once 
the apportionment scheme was enlarged to come into effect when other 
large groups were denied the right to vote, a change was made. 
At the time, aside from the African-American community, there was 
only one group of people in the country whose voting rights might be 
denied that was large enough to affect apportionment under a non-racial 
apportionment scheme—the unreconstructed Southern whites who had 
participated in the rebellion and who the framers of the new 
constitutional amendment specifically planned to disfranchise.  The 
intent to disfranchise large numbers of white voters explains why there 
                                                 
102 Id. at 81-82.  Justice Marshall then quoted Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965), to 
the effect that denying the right to vote to “a sector of the population because of the way 
they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.”  Id. 
103 Compare Morgan-Foster, supra note 49, at 316-18, with Chin, supra note 81, at 311-13. 
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was a need for an exclusion clause in Section 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and casts light on how that clause should be interpreted. 
Section 2 was aimed at encouraging the reconstructed Southern 
states to provide their black citizens the right to vote by threatening to 
diminish their power if blacks were not included in the electorate.  
However, the framers of Section 2 also intended to strip political power 
from white males who had served the Confederate cause, at least until 
the governments of the newly reconstructed states could get on their 
feet.  This would allow African-American voters, in conjunction with 
what loyal whites could be found, to provide protection to the freedmen 
in voting as a counterweight to the power of those who had previously 
brought the country close to ruin.  The whites who were to be denied 
voting rights were an indeterminate, yet substantial number, and the 
framers of Section 2 did not want the newly reconstructed governments, 
if they permitted blacks to vote, to be deprived of representation because 
former rebels had been disfranchised.  The only group of prospective 
disfranchisees large enough to affect apportionment was the whites who 
had given aid and comfort to the Confederate cause.  It was this group of 
people that the framers of Section 2 intended to cover with the exception 
clause they tacked onto the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Richardson Court’s interpretation of Section 2 ignores the 
obvious fact that its framers had in mind white voters who had given aid 
and comfort to the Confederate cause during the Civil War.  The 
argument that the framers were concerned with felon disfranchisement 
when they wrote Section 2 ignores two other salient points.  First, 
legislators rarely pass laws to cover problems they cannot imagine will 
ever arise.  In the context of 1866, no one could have imagined a 
generalized “crime wave” that would create enough felons to affect the 
apportionment of seats in the national Congress or Electoral College.  
Therefore, there was no reason for them to have written an exclusion 
clause to make sure that the new apportionment scheme they 
contemplated would not be affected by felon disfranchisement of some 
mythical criminal class of the future.  Second, the exclusion clause was 
passed with no discussion of an intent to deny voting rights to felons, the 
wisdom of such a rule, or lack thereof.  Instead, the legislative history of 
Section 2 focused on the issues of that time:  inclusion of newly freed 
black citizens in the electorate and exclusion of white citizens who had 
tried to destroy the Union. 
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The Richardson Court’s lack of awareness of the many versions of the 
exclusion clause, its failure to consider the linkage between the policies 
of inclusion and exclusion that lay at the heart of the Radicals’ political 
program, and its refusal to consider the realities of the time all led to an 
erroneous interpretation of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The 
time is ripe to reconsider Richardson v. Ramirez. 
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